HiveGate - Agent Swarm Gateway print no. 001
groq · checking
Groq API Key Override (uses .env by default)
Clean print (hide grain & offset)
URL
IDLE AEGIS COMMERCE · FLASH SALE PORTAL
6 AGENTS · 5 TOOLS · READY
Inspect multi-agent waves, 4-Pillar Security/LLM/Latency Benchmarks, or Agent Gateway protection
Wave Agent Endpoint Exposed (Pink Pass) Agent Gateway (Teal Pass)
Run an audit to record the 6 intercepted multi-agent waves.
Run an audit to inspect the 6-agent hierarchy and Groq planning rationales.
4-PILLAR EVALUATION & BENCHMARK SCORECARD (01_EVALS · 02_DEPLOY · 03_SECURITY · 04_TELEMETRY) GRADE: NOT EVALUATED (RUN AUDIT)
DETECTED STACK: not evaluated LATENCY WATERFALL: not measured (run audit to measure)
Pillar & Evaluation Dimension Measured Current State What It Was Lacking (Before) What It Has To Be (Target Benchmark) Status & Module
Load any URL or press RUN AUDIT to compute the 4-Pillar Evaluation & Benchmark Scorecard.
1. Proxy Env 
AGENT_GATEWAY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8010
UPSTREAM_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8010/targets/aegis-store
2. YAML Policy 
budgets:
  max_calls: 120
  max_depth: 3
read_only_agents:
  - reader-audit-01
3. Python SDK 
from sdk.client import GatewayClient
gw = GatewayClient("http://127.0.0.1:8010")
await gw.call(goal_id="g1", agent_id="a1", tool="read")
HOW AGENT GATEWAY PROTECTS YOUR BACKEND (5 ACTIVE GUARDRAILS) IN-PROCESS CONTROL PLANE
01 / ADAPTIVE ADMISSION & FAIR QUEUE (admission.py · scheduler.py) CAP: 3 CONCURRENT · 0 429s
Caps concurrent upstream requests and schedules goals via weighted fair queuing. When 36+ agents burst at once, excess calls wait in a bounded queue instead of triggering 429 Too Many Requests.
02 / SINGLEFLIGHT DEDUPLICATION & TTL CACHE (dedup.py) COALESCED: -- · SAVED: --
Hashes (tool, normalized_payload) so identical in-flight read requests share a single upstream call, and caches recent reads to eliminate redundant LLM sub-agent polling.
03 / FENCED LEASES & VERSIONED CAS STATE (locks.py · state.py) LOST WRITES: 0 · FENCED
Grants expiring leases with monotonically increasing fencing_token numbers and requires If-Match version checks on shared state so concurrent writers never overwrite each other.
04 / GOAL BUDGETS & RECURSION DEPTH BREAKER (budgets.py) MAX DEPTH: d=3 · PRUNED: --
Tracks parent→child call_id lineage across the entire agent swarm and halts runaway recursive fan-out (`budget_exceeded: max_depth`) before exponential token/API cost explosions.
05 / YAML POLICY ENGINE & HUMAN APPROVAL GATE (policy.py) DELETE BLOCKED · >=$100 GATED
Enforces per-agent tool rules (blocking read_only_agent from DELETE endpoints) and pauses high-value financial actions (`>= $100`) in pending_approval until human sign-off.
TEST INDIVIDUAL GUARDRAIL:
MEASURED PROTECTION TELEMETRY EXPOSED vs. GATEWAY
Protection Metric Exposed With Gateway
Valid Call Completion -- --
Client Calls Issued -- --
Backend Calls Sent -- --
Calls Avoided (Saved) 0 --
Singleflight Deduplicated 0 --
Upstream 429 Overload Errors -- 0
Peak Backend Concurrency -- --
Lost Concurrent Writes -- 0
Recursion Depth Reached -- --
Runaway Calls Pruned 0 --
Policy Violations Blocked 0 (Allowed!) --
Latency (p50 / p99) -- --